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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 THE HAGUE 002298

SIPDIS

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TAGS: ASEC PTER

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE
QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPOQ)

REF: STATE 249843

Classified By: DCM DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASONS 1.5 (D)

THE HAGUE RESPONSE, INCLUDING AMSTERDAM, TO REFTEL IS AS
FOLLOWS:

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

11. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS

1A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY
THAT ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATIONS?

-YES, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES,
TURKS (300,000), MOROCCANS (280,000), IRAQIS (33,000),
SOMALIS (29,000) AND IRANIANS 23,000) IN THE NETHERLANDS THAT
WOULD
CARRY OUT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IF SUITABLY STIMULATED
BY THEIR COMMUNITY LEADERS. THE NETHERLANDS IS HOME TO THE
LARGEST AFGHAN REFUGEE COMMUNITY IN WESTERN EUROPE, PERHAPS
30,000 PERSONS. THERE ARE ALSO NON-MUSLIM GROUPS THAT WOULD
CARRY OUT ANTI-MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS (ANTI-WAR, PRO-PEACE,
ANTI-DEATH PENALTY, ETC) AT MILITARY FACILITIES OF US, NL, OR
NATO. ANTI-GLOBALIZATION GROUPS ARE ACTIVE, ESPECIALLY IN
AMSTERDAM.

1B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

-YES

1C. HAVE THESE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

-YES-BOTH IN THE HAGUE AND AMSTERDAM.

1D. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION?

-ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS ARE USUALLY COMPRISED OF A FEW
(4 OR 5) PERSONS WITH LARGE-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS RANGING FROM
200 TO 300 PERSONS. THERE WAS AN ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATION ON
FEBRUARY 15, 2003 DURING THE WORLD-WIDE DEMONSTRATION, THAT
WAS COMPRISED OF APPROXIMATELY 30,000 TO 50,000 PERSONS THAT
TOOK PLACE IN AMSTERDAM BUT WAS NOT IN THE VICINITY OF THE
CONSULATE GENERAL. THE MAYOR OF AMSTERDAM HAS FORBIDDEN
DEMONSTRATORS IN THE VICINITY OF THE CONSULATE.

1E. ARE THESE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED
BY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES OR MILITARY ACTIONS OR BY
DOMESTIC ISSUES?

-DEMONSTRATIONS ARE USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
INITIATIVES OR MILITARY ACTIONS. CURRENTLY, THE MOST COMMON
TRIGGER IS THE WAR WITH IRAQ. OPPOSITION TO THE DEATH PENALTY
IS WIDESPREAD IN THE NETHERLANDS AND MEMBERS OF THESE GROUP
HAVE PROTESTED AT THE EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL IN THE
PAST.

1F. ARE THESE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

-GENERALLY PEACEFUL. DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE HAGUE ARE OFTEN
MORE POLITICALLY FOCUSED WHILE THOSE IN AMSTERDAM ARE OFTEN
"MEDIA EVENTS/STREET THEATER".

1G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO
USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES?

-USG EMPLOYEES HAVE NOT SUSTAINED INJURIES AS A RESULT OF
DEMONSTRATIONS. AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE HAS SUSTAINED DAMAGE THAT
INCLUDED SPRAY PAINT ON THE EMBASSY FAADE AND A BROKEN
ROLL-DOWN SHUTTER AS A RESULT OF A DEMONSTRATION ON MARCH 1,
12003. ROCKS, BRICKS AND BOTTLES HAVE BEEN THROWN AT THE
CONSULATE GENERAL NUMEROUS TIMES, RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
VEHICLES AND CONSULATE WINDOWS, BUT THESE INCIDENTS DID NOT
OCCUR DURING DEMONSTRATIONS.

- IN EARLY 2003, DEMONSTRATORS CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO
ANTENNAS AT A US AIR FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITY
LOCATED ON THE VOLKEL AIR BASE IN SOUTHERN NETHERLANDS.

1H. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR PERIMETER SECURITY LINE?

-YES, ON MARCH 1, 2003, SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS OUT OF A 300 PERSON DEMONSTRATION, ENTERED THE NEW TEMPORARY PERIMETER FENCE AT U.S. EMBASSY IN THE HAGUE, SPRAY PAINTED ANTI-WAR AND ANTI-US SLOGANS ON THE EMBASSY FAADE, THREW BOTTLES AND SPONGES, AND PLACED PICKET SIGNS IN THE FENCE, WHILE POLICE WATCHED AND FAILED TO INTERVENE. THE GOVERNMENT IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAVE PROMISED NON-RECURRENCE.

-DEMONSTRATORS FREQUENTLY ENTER VOLKEL AIR BASE IN SOUTHERN NETHERLANDS, A BASE USED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE, BY CUTTING THE FENCE ALONG THE BASE PERIMETER. THE DEMONSTRATORS USUALLY AVOID USG FACILITIES ON THE BASE PREFERING TO DEFACE AND CAUSE MINOR DAMAGE TO NL PROPERTY. IN EARLY MAR 2003, DEMONSTRATORS AGAIN RETURNED TO THE US AIR FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITY (SEE PARAGRAPH I ABOVE) AND PAINTED GRAFFITI ON ALL FOUR WALLS AFTER CUTTING THROUGH THE FENCE SURROUNDING THIS BUILDING. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INJURIES TO USG PERSONNEL AS A RESULT OF THESE DEMONSTRATIONS AT VOLKEL.

1I. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

-YES, ALTHOUGH THESE ARE FREQUENT, THEY ARE ALMOST ALWAYS PEACEFUL.

1J. HAVE THESE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

-YES. WHILE THE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKE PLACE AT THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS ABOUT 0.5 KM AWAY, THE ASSEMBLY POINT FOR MOST DEMONSTRATIONS IS IN A FIELD LOCATED A BLOCK AWAY FROM THE EMBASSY. THE ROUTE OF MARCH FOR MOST DEMONSTRATIONS GOES DIRECTLY PAST THE SIDE OF THE EMBASSY.

1K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS?

-500-1000 PERSONS

1L. ARE THESE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

-GENERALLY BUT NOT ALWAYS PEACEFUL.

1M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY?

-WITH REGARD TO ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS, NO USG PROPERTY HAS BEEN DAMAGED RECENTLY ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN DAMAGE TO EMBASSY EMPLOYEES, POVS PARKED IN THE VICINITY OF THE CHANCERY IN THE PAST.

12. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS

1A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS)

-NO, EXCEPT AS A MEMBER OF THE US LED COALITION AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM.

-THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS IS THE LEAD PARTNER ALONG WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA IN THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA COAST GUARD (NAACG). THE NAACG IS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING INTO THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA FROM SOUTH AMERICA. THERE ARE OCCASIONALLY VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN COAST GUARD UNITS AND DRUG SMUGGLERS NEAR THE ISLANDS OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA.

1B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY THAT IS LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR?

-N/A

1C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION?

- YES. THERE IS A UNITED STATES CONSULATE LOCATED IN WILLEMSTAD, CAPITAL OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ON THE ISLAND OF CURACAO.

1D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN THESE INTRASTATE CONFLICTS SIGNALLED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION?

-NO

13. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES

1A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED?

-YES, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ARE WELL TRAINED BUT ADHERE TO POLICIES THAT DIFFER FROM THE UNITED STATES, WITH REGARDS TO REGULATING DEMONSTRATIONS AND RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS.

1B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING.

-NOT IN GENERAL, ALTHOUGH THERE IS COOPERATION AND CROSS-TRAINING ON SPECIFIC ISSUES.

1C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS, WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES?

-NO, CORRUPTION DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE A PROBLEM GENERALLY, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE RECENT DRUG-DEALING CHARGES AGAINST SOME AMSTERDAM POLICE OFFICERS. A MORE WIDESPREAD PROBLEM HAS BEEN OFF-DUTY USE OF SOFT DRUGS. INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY ALLEGES THAT THE ROTTERDAM PORT AND SCHIPHOL AIRPORT HAVE A CORRUPTION PROBLEM INVOLVING DRUGS.

1D. ARE THE SECURITY SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS?

-YES, COMPARABLE TO OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. MOST RECENT SUCCESS WAS THE BEGHAL INVESTIGATION (2 YEARS). ARE THE SECURITY SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS?

-YES, COMPARABLE TO OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. MOST RECENT SUCCESS, ALMOST TWO YEARS ALMOST 2 YEARS (BEGHAL). THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IS &ARE THE SECURITY SERVICES WILLING TO DETER TERRORIST ACTIONS? IN THIS SCORE, THE DUTCH SERVICES, AS WITH THEIR POLITICIANS, ARE NOT PROACTIVE. THEY ARE NOT CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORISM BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE ROBUST HUMINT CAPABILITIES AND THEIR USE OF IMBEDDED SOURCES IS EXTREMELY LIMITED, THUS SEVERELY LIMITING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.

1E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT?

-THE NETHERLANDS STILL DOES NOT HAVE A WORKING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ANALYSIS AGENCY AND INSTEAD HAS A SECURITY AGENCY. THE SECURITY AGENCY IS MOSTLY COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT, HOWEVER LOCAL PRIVACY LAWS INHIBIT THE SHARING OF &PERSONAL INFORMATION8 ON ARRESTED PERSONS. ALSO, CULTURAL PRE-DISPOSITION TOWARDS AVOIDING A PROACTIVE STANCE HAS LIMITED COOPERATION FROM REACHING A LEVEL WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS SOUGHT.

1F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES?

-YES, TWICE IN THE LAST YEAR.

1G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY?

-AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSTANT DIALOGUE WITH THE GONL SINCE 9/11/01 SEEKING ENHANCED SECURITY FOR ALL U.S. MISSION ELEMENTS. THE HOST NATION GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO PUT NEEDED BARRIERS AND SURVEILLANCE IN PLACE. THE JERSEY BARRIERS ARE INEFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING A VBIED ATTACK. THE EMBASSY REMAINS VULNERABLE TO PENETRATION BY SMALL GROUPS OF PERSONNEL AS WELL AS TO MORE DRAMATIC TRUCK BOMB ATTACKS.

THE GONL IS PLANNING A TRANSITION, THE EXACT DETAILS OF WHICH ARE STILL NOT YET KNOWN, WHICH INVOLVES REPLACING THE MILITARY POLICE WITH LOCAL POLICE OFFICERS ARMED WITH SIDE ARMS AS OPPOSED TO LONG ARMS. SPECIFICS SUCH AS WHETHER THE LOCAL POLICE WOULD BE PRESENT INSIDE THE EMBASSY PERIMETER ARE YET TO BE DETERMINED. AS A RESULT OF THE PLANNED TRANSITION, THE GONL RECENTLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF MILITARY POLICE PRESENCE AT BOTH THE U.S. EMBASSY IN THE HAGUE AND THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN AMSTERDAM FROM 6 TO 3 OFFICERS AND REDUCED THE WORKING HOURS, BOTH WITHOUT ANY PRIOR NOTICE. REPEATED REQUESTS HAVE RESULTED IN A TEMPORARY INCREASE IN MILITARY POLICE PRESENCE AT THE EMBASSY FROM 3 TO 5 MILITARY POLICE. DETAILS REGARDING PLANS FOR THE TRANSITION ARE YET TO BE DETERMINED BY THE GONL.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ERECTED A CROWD-CONTROL BARRIER APPROXIMATELY 30 YARDS FROM THE PERIMETER GATE, INCREASING THE SET-BACK OF THE EMBASSY. THE SET-BACK DISTANCE AND FENCE HEIGHT HOWEVER, STILL DO NOT MEET DS REQUIREMENTS AND ARE NOT SUFFICIENT.

UPON ENGAGEMENT OF WAR WITH IRAQ ON MARCH 20, 2003, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CLOSED THE STREETS RUNNING IN FRONT AND ON THE SIDE OF THE EMBASSY TO VEHICULAR TRAFFIC, ALTHOUGH THE STREETS HAVE SINCE BEEN RE-OPENED

1H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD, GOOD/AVERAGE; POOR)

-VERY GOOD TO EXCELLENT DUE TO SIGNIFICANT POST 9/11 UPGRADES AT SCHIPHOL AIRPORT, THE PREMIER DUTCH AIRPORT AND THE THIRD BUSIEST IN EUROPE.

1I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

-THE CUSTOMS AGENCY IS A SIGNATORY OF THE SCHENGEN TREATY, A RESULT OF WHICH IS THAT THERE ARE NO CONTROL POINTS ON LAND BORDERS. DUTCH CUSTOMS OCCASIONALLY DOES SPOT CHECKS AT LAND BORDERS. AS OF 09/03/2002 US CUSTOMS CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI) IS ACTIVE AT THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM. THIS PILOT PROGRAM IS A COOPERATIVE EFFORT OF NL AND US CUSTOMS.

-IMMIGRATION: EFFECTIVE. BORDER CONTROLS AT SCHIPHOL AIRPORT AND AT SEAPORTS ARE HANDLED BY THE ROYAL MARECHAUSSÉE (MILITARY CONSTABULARY KNOWN AS KMAR), A VERY EFFECTIVE BRANCH OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

THE DUTCH IMMIGRATION SERVICE (IND) IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION AND DOES NOT HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BORDER CONTROLS, HOWEVER A JOINT IND-INS COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT HAS RESULTED IN TWO INS AGENTS ASSIGNED TDY TO SCHIPHOL AIRPORT TO ASSIST BOTH THE KMAR AND IND AND IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE SHARING, PARTICULARLY TERRORIST INFORMATION.

1J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

-SEE (I) ABOVE.

INDIGENOUS TERRORISM

14. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

1A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN COUNTRY?

-NONE THAT IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS SUCH THAT WE ARE AWARE OF. HOWEVER, THE NETHERLANDS IS A KNOWN SANCTUARY FOR NUMEROUS ANTI-U.S. FOREIGN-BASED GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT CONSIDER THEMSELVES AFFILIATED WITH SUCH GROUPS.

15. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS

1A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY?

-YES

1B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.

-ONE: RA-RA (NOW INACTIVE FOR APPROX. 3 YEARS)
REVOLUTIONARY ANTI-RACISM ALLIANCE, AN ULTRA LEFTIST GROUP FIRST ORGANIZED TO PROTEST SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID AND RACIST SENTIMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS. THIS GROUP WAS VIOLENTLY OPPOSED TO RESTRICTIONS ON GRANTING REFUGEE STATUS. THEY HAVE USED ARSON AND BOMBS IN THE PAST. THE LARGEST COUNTRY WIDE MEMBERSHIP IS IN/AROUND AMSTERDAM

1C. HAVE THESE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED?

-YES, THE MOST RECENT WAS APPROXIMATELY THREE YEARS AGO. RECENTLY HOWEVER, TELEPHONIC/HOAX BOMB THREATS OCCURRED IN WHICH THE CALLER CLAIMED TO BE A MEMBER OF RA-RA.

1D. WERE THESE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE?

- A BOMB WAS PLANTED IN A PUBLIC TOILET OF A NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT BUILDING, WHICH DID NOT RESULT IN ANY DEATHS.

1E. HAVE ANY AMERICANS EVER BEEN KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE ATTACKS?

-NO

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

16. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS

1A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES.

(S/NF)-REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT (TURKEY) (DHKP/C), KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (TURKEY) (PKK), EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (AL-JIHAD) (EIJ), AL-GAMA' AT AL-ISLAMIYYA (ISLAMIC GROUP) (EIG), ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA) SOCIAL, SALAFI GROUP FOR CALL AND COMBAT (ALGERIA)- GIA

FACTION (GSPC), AL QA'IDA, HAMAS, AND THE NEW PEOPLES, ARMY/COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES. THE ARAB EUROPEAN LEAGUE (AEL) HAS A NASCENT PRESENCE IN THE NETHERLANDS.

1B. HOW DOES THE EAC ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL?

(S/NF)- SOME OPERATIONAL CELLS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WHILE OTHERS ARE SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL CELLS. THE DUTCH HAVE RECENTLY FROZEN THE ASSETS OF A HAMAS-RELATED CHARITY IN THE NETHERLANDS.

AN OPERATIONAL CELL RECRUITED AND DISPATCHED TWO NETHERLANDS BORN AND RAISED YOUNG MEN OF MOROCCAN BACKGROUND TO THE JIHAD IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TWO WOUND UP IN INDIAN CONTROLLED KASMR AND WERE KILLED ATTACKING INDIAN SECURITY FORCES.

A SUPPORT CELL WAS RUNNING THE ROTTERDAM SAFEHOUSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE BEHGAH PLOT TO BLOW UP AMEMBASSY PARIS. IN APRIL AUTHORITIES ARRESTED MEMBERS OF A GSPC CELL IN NORTHERN NETHERLANDS THAT IS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN AN OPERATIONAL CELL. ON 08/30/02 GONL SECURITY FORCES ARRESTED 12 &JIHADIST8 REPORTEDLY ASSOCIATED WITH AL QA, IDA AND GSPC. AS OF JULY 2003, MOST HAVE BEEN RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGES. OTHERS REMAINING IN CUSTODY WILL NOT BE CHARGED WITH ANY TERRORIST-RELATED OFFENSES. ONE WAS DEPORTED ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES.

ADDITIONALLY NL AUTHORITIES ARE ACTIVELY MONITORING MORE THEN 100 INDIVIDUALS WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED AFFILIATIONS TO NUMEROUS TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE ARAB-EUROPEAN LEAGUE (AEL), AN ISLAMIC EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION WITH HEADQUARTERS IN BELGIUM AND BRANCHES IN THE NETHERLANDS, GERMANY, FRANCE, THE UK, LEBANON, LIBYA AND SYRIA, CLAIMS TO BE STRIVING AFTER EMANCIPATION OF ARABS AND MUSLIMS IN EUROPE BY DEMANDING WHAT IS ALREADY &RIGHTFULLY THEIRS8. THE ORGANIZATION, LED BY ABOU JAHJAH (DPOB 24 JUNE 1971; LEBANON BINT JAIL), HAS SO FAR REMAINED WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS, THOUGH IT HAS STAGED VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN BELGIUM. ACCORDING TO DUTCH SECURITY OFFICIALS, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IF WAR AGAINST IRAQ BREAKS OUT, THE AEL MAY RESORT TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE OR EVEN TO VIOLENCE IN THE NETHERLANDS.

1C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

-NOT IN THE SLIGHTEST

1D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS?

-YES, SEVERAL EXIST AND ARE ALLOWED TO OPERATE RATHER FREELY BECAUSE OF THE LIBERAL DUTCH ATTITUDE WHICH TENDS TO INAPPROPRIATELY MINIMIZE THIS RESPONSE.

1E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

-YES--RADICAL ISLAMICS, OF WHICH THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENT ETHNIC SUBGROUPS IN THE NETHERLANDS.

1F. HOW DOES THE EAC ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS?

(S/NF)-WITH THE EXCEPTION OF IRAQ, LOW PROBABILITY OF A HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SUPPORTING TERRORIST ACTS IN-COUNTRY. HOST GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS THAT WOULD NEGATE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

1G. HOW DOES THE EAC ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS?

-LEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IS CLOSELY CONTROLLED IN-COUNTRY, AS ARE EXPLOSIVES. HAVING SAID THAT, SHOOTINGS ARE BECOMING MORE COMMON AND RICHARD &SHOE-BOMBER8 REID IS ALLEGED TO HAVE ACQUIRED HIS SHOE BOMB IN AMSTERDAM. PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES AND HAND GRENADES ARE BECOMING MORE EASILY OBTAINABLE IN THE NETHERLANDS. CRIMINAL GANGS HAVE READY ACCESS TO FIREARMS. SHIPMENTS OF ILLEGAL WEAPONS ARE FROM TIME TO TIME UNCOVERED IN MARINE MERCHANT VESSELS DOCKING IN THE BENELUX. RECENT REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF THE INCREASING NUMBER OF ILLEGAL WEAPONS IS FROM THE BALKANS THROUGH GERMANY INTO THE NETHERLANDS. REPORTS ALSO INDICATE THAT WEAPONS AND NARCOTICS ARE BEING TRADED BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS, SOUTH AMERICA AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

THIS CONCLUDES THE HAGUE REPORT.
SOBEL